Appendix A: Methodology

Fund Universe

Index Equity Funds: 

The index equity fund universe consists of 67 funds managed by 31 asset managers. We used Morningstar Investor to identify equity index mutual funds and ETFs with net assets of more than $1 billion. The fund universe was restricted to funds that hold U.S. securities and track capitalization-weighted, broad-market diversified indices—including large-cap, total-market, and global indices. Small and mid-cap funds, sector-based funds, ESG funds, equal-weight funds, and international ex-US funds were excluded from the analysis since they do not provide broad, market-wide exposure consistent with universal owner characteristics. Factor-based funds such as growth, value, and dividend funds were also excluded because their rules-based tilts reflect a deliberate investment strategy that deviates from the market portfolio. Although they only capture a segment of the market, large-cap funds were included because the companies they hold constitute the lion’s share of US market capitalization and drive the vast majority of system-level externalities. In order to ensure that the funds included in the analysis are aligned with the long-horizon buy-and-hold posture of universal owners, we included only funds with a turnover ratio of less than 15%. 

Funds were further categorized by size into three groups by assets under management (AUM)—mid-sized ($1–10B), large ($10–100B), and mega (>$100B)—to reflect the scale of funds’ market influence. Larger funds command greater voting power across the market and have more resources to devote to stewardship. Moreover, their broad market footprint—reflected in the sheer number of companies they hold, the large share of the overall market they cover, and the interconnected exposures that come with highly diversified portfolios—enables them to shape governance practices in ways that accumulate into system-level effects. Mega funds in particular function as systemically important universal owners whose voting behavior can shape not only firm-level outcomes but also economy-wide externalities. 

Proposal Universe

Shareholder Proposals:

We used Diligent Market Intelligence to identify shareholder resolutions related to climate change, inequality, and responsible technology. The issuer universe was restricted to Russell 3000 companies headquartered in the US that had their annual general meetings between July 1, 2024 and June 30, 2025. The final universe consists of 133 shareholder proposals, including 48 climate proposals, 69 inequality-related proposals, and 21 responsible technology proposals. Proposals were further divided into sub-categories. Some proposals were included in more than one category or sub-category.

We excluded all “anti-ESG” proposals seeking to roll back racial and gender equity initiatives (often under the guise of concern for “viewpoint or religious discrimination”), stall corporate action on climate change, and promote union suppression. These proposals were filed by anti-ESG proponents such as American Conservative Values ETF, Bowyer Research, Inspire Investing, Bahnsen Family Trust, National Center for Public Policy Research, and National Legal and Policy Center (NLPC). However, we did include five NLPC proposals in the responsible technology category. These proposals, which asked tech companies to issue reports on ethical AI data acquisition and usage, did not have an expressly anti-ESG objective and reflected credible concerns around AI governance and risks with respect to data sourcing, privacy, and copyright infringement. In contrast to most anti-ESG proposals, which receive less than 2% support, these proposals garnered considerable support from mainstream investors, receiving on average 18.1% of votes cast.

Climate Director Elections: 

The universe of climate director votes is based on Majority Action’s 2025 proxy season vote guide, which recommended against responsible directors at eight companies with poor climate performance—three electric utilities, two oil and gas companies, one bank, and two insurers. 

For each sector, we determined priority and additional criteria for climate performance, and assessed a long list of issuers against those criteria. We determined that misalignment on priority criteria warranted a vote against responsible directors, while misalignment on additional criteria provided further basis for a no-vote. We examined company documents on board and committee oversight responsibilities in order to identify the director most responsible for lack of adequate oversight.

For electric utilities, priority criteria were (a) net zero emissions by 2050 or sooner, (b) coal power planned capacity alignment, and (c) natural gas power planned capacity alignment. Additional criteria were (a) medium-term emissions targets, and (b) policy engagement. For oil and gas, priority criteria were (a) net zero emissions by 2050 or sooner, and (b) recent capex investments. Additional criteria were (a) medium-term emissions targets, (b) future capex investments, and (c) policy engagement. For banks, priority criteria were (a) absolute medium-term oil and gas targets, and (b) exclusion policies for unconventional fossil fuels. For insurers, the priority criterion was fossil fuel exclusion policies and the additional criterion was disclosure of scope 3 insured emissions.

Assessments of these criteria drew from the Climate Action 100+ Net Zero Company Benchmark, the Ceres Net Zero Standard for North American Banks, and research by the Transition Pathway Initiative Global Climate Transition Centre, Sierra Club, Partnership for Carbon Accounting Financials, Insure Our Future, and Reclaim Finance.

Say-on-Pay Proposals

The say-on-pay universe includes 18 proposals at S&P 500 companies that have the most extreme disparities in executive-to-worker compensation. We used the AFL-CIO’s 2025 Executive Paywatch report to obtain the CEO pay ratio for every S&P 500 firm. The CEO pay ratios in the AFL-CIO report are sourced from companies’ 2025 proxy statements. To select for firms with the highest levels of intra-firm inequality, we screened for companies whose CEO pay ratios ranked in the top decile of the S&P 500 (> 1,037:1). We restricted our universe to companies that had their annual general meetings between July 1, 2024 and June 30, 2025.

Proxy Voting Data

Fund-level proxy voting data for asset managers was obtained from Diligent, which aggregates information from SEC Form N-PX filings. In cases where Diligent did not have the proxy voting data, we sourced from the fund website or directly from N-PX filings. There were two funds that met our criteria for inclusion but were excluded from our analysis because proxy voting data was not readily available through Diligent, the SEC EDGAR database, or the fund website. These were the iShares Russell 1000 Large Cap Index Fund and the iShares S&P 500 Index Fund. Additionally, State Street’s SPDR S&P 500 ETF—a core holding of institutional investors—was excluded from the analysis because it is registered as a unit investment trust and does not disclose proxy voting records.²¹

Fund-level proxy voting data is not available for European asset managers. Consistent with UK and EU law, most European asset managers disclose their proxy voting at the manager-wide level. These manager-level disclosures are available through Diligent. The four European managers featured in our analysis centralize their stewardship functions across all their funds. To create a fund-level dataset for European funds, we filtered each manager’s aggregate proxy voting report against the fund’s portfolio holdings, retaining only those votes cast at companies held by the fund. 

Proxy voting data for pension funds was obtained from Diligent and fund websites. For five out of the 23 pension funds included in our analysis, proxy voting data is limited to say-on-pay votes. These funds disclose compensation-related votes due to SEC reporting obligations, but do not disclose any other proxy votes.²² Proxy voting data for the New York State Common Retirement Fund was only available through December 31, 2024 at the time of this analysis.

Voting Metrics

Average Support

To calculate average support at the fund level, we coded all For votes as 1 and all other vote outcomes (Against, Abstain, Withhold, DNV) as 0 and computed the simple average within each category and sub-category. Category averages are not weighted by sub-category. To calculate average support at the manager level, we computed a weighted average of the fund-level average support across all the manager’s funds, where the weights correspond to each fund’s AUM. A similar approach was used to calculate the average support for the New York City Retirement System. To calculate average support at the fund size level, we computed the mean of fund-level average support for all funds in the fund size category. 

Changes to the N-PX form that went into effect in 2024 provide more insight into split voting and voting choice, which have dominated conversations about asset manager proxy voting in recent years. The increase in split voting, wherein a fund votes in multiple ways on the same ballot item, reflects the expansion of vote choice offerings by the largest asset managers. A fund that engaged in split voting was assigned a “1” if more than 75% of shares were cast for the proposal, and “0” if more than 75% of shares were cast against a proposal. If no particular vote position garnered more than 75%, we assigned the vote a “0.5,” reflecting a true split vote outcome. Of the 67 funds in our analysis, eight offered voting choice. Only six votes in our entire universe received a “0.5,” revealing that the vast majority of votes cast by voting choice funds were voted in one direction or the other.

Adjusted Support

In some cases, we refer to a shareholder proposal’s “adjusted support,” which is meant to capture the level of support from non-insider shareholders. Insider shareholders are defined as current directors and officers, as well as current and former officers, founders, and families who exert significant voting power. We calculated the number of voting shares held by insiders from company proxy statements and obtained absolute voting outcomes for each proposal in our universe from 8Ks. Adjusted support was calculated as follows: Adjusted Support = Votes For ÷ (Votes For + Votes Against – Votes Held By Insiders). We assume insiders voted all their shares and voted against the proposal. We did not calculate adjusted support for director elections or say-on-pay proposals.

The information in this report has been prepared from sources and data the authors believe to be reliable, but Majority Action assumes no liability for and makes no guarantee as to its adequacy, accuracy, timeliness, or completeness.